Who Will Control Anthropic After Its Planned IPO?
Anthropic’s S-1 splits general voting control and board elections between founders and the LTBT. What do PBC duties and Class A, T, F and E shares mean for investors?
A share carrying one vote sounds straightforward: buy enough shares, elect the directors, change the direction of the company. Anthropic’s proposed IPO would break that familiar chain in two places.
Under the structure described in its October 26, 2026 S-1, a single Class F share held by a company formed by seven co-founders would carry 50.1% of the voting power on matters submitted to stockholders generally. Meanwhile, the Long-Term Benefit Trust, or LTBT, would generally elect a majority of the authorized board through Class T stock. Public investors would buy Class A shares, with one vote each. Those are three different kinds of power. S-1 cover and governance discussion
The offering remains proposed in that filing. Anthropic intends to list on the Nasdaq Global Select Market as ANT, but the number of shares and the price range had not been determined. Filing an S-1 is not the same as completing an IPO. Anthropic’s announcement
For a prospective shareholder, the governance question sits alongside the financial one. Claude may become a valuable business. But when revenue, model safety and effects on society pull in different directions, who gets to choose the trade-off?
A public benefit corporation must balance interests, not promise which one always wins
Anthropic is a Delaware public benefit corporation, or PBC. It is a for-profit corporation. The distinction is in the board’s duties: directors must balance stockholders’ financial interests, the best interests of people materially affected by the company’s conduct, and the public benefit specified in its charter. Anthropic’s stated purpose is the responsible development and maintenance of advanced AI for humanity’s long-term benefit. Delaware law, Sections 362 and 365; S-1, p. 244
Consider a hypothetical model that could earn substantial revenue but still raises unresolved safety concerns. The PBC framework requires the board to consider the safety and stakeholder implications alongside the money. It does not predetermine that the model must be delayed, or let directors disregard stockholders merely by invoking the mission. The difficult judgment remains theirs.
Anthropic expressly warns that balancing these interests could hurt business performance or its share price over the short, medium or long term. It also notes the limited judicial precedent on how courts will evaluate that balancing exercise. A PBC designation creates a duty and room for judgment; it does not certify that the judgment will be good. S-1, p. 244
That answers what directors must consider. It leaves another question open: who chooses those directors, and who can replace them? The LTBT is Anthropic’s institutional answer.
The trust gets a board majority, with an extra procedure for one seat
The LTBT holds Class T stock. That stock has no economic rights and generally does not vote on matters submitted to stockholders at large. Its central power concerns board membership. Upon completion of the IPO, the board would have seven authorized seats: four elected by Class T and three elected by Class A and Class F voting together. S-1, pp. 245 and 257
Four seats do not mean four people are already serving. The filing describes three initial Class T directors and one vacancy. At the time of filing, the board actually had six directors. Authorized seats establish the allocation of rights; occupied seats tell you who is there to exercise a director’s judgment.
Nor does electing directors mean the trust runs Claude. Business decisions belong to the board. The LTBT and its trustees do not directly manage day-to-day operations or set company strategy. Their influence works through selecting and removing directors who are meant to balance the PBC’s three sets of interests. S-1, p. 245
One of the four seats is designated the “Specified Class T Director.” Nominating that director, removing the director without cause, or changing who holds the designation requires concurrence from the nominating and corporate governance committee, or NGC. The committee would consist of one Class T director and two directors who are not Class T directors, acting by majority vote.
If the committee rejects the proposal, or does not concur within 15 days of notice, the LTBT can withdraw it. Otherwise, it goes to Class E holders. Class E is the planned employee governance stock: it has no economic rights and votes only on specified matters. Approval requires a majority of votes cast, with a quorum representing a majority of outstanding E shares. Removal for cause is different: any Class T director can be removed for cause under Delaware law without NGC or E approval, subject to the agreed advance-notice procedure. S-1, p. 245; charter form, Section 7.1
The specified-seat procedure matters because the trust’s majority is only one seat larger than the rest of the board. For one of its four seats, nomination and removal without cause must pass through a committee on which non-T directors hold the majority, or through a vote of employee E holders. The LTBT has substantial appointment power, but cannot decide every seat unilaterally.
One Class F share preserves a majority vote without taking over Class T elections
Stockholder voting is a separate layer. Immediately before the proposed IPO closes, Anthropic plans to issue one Class F share to the Founder LLC, initially owned by seven co-founders. The share would have no economic rights, but would carry a fixed 50.1% of total voting power on matters submitted to stockholders generally. Later stock issuances for fundraising, acquisitions or compensation would not dilute that percentage. S-1, pp. 248–249
Public investors could therefore own more A shares without pushing F below its general voting majority. Economic ownership could change while this reserved share of the vote stayed fixed.
The 50.1% is neither a claim on 50.1% of the company’s economic value nor a personal vote belonging to the CEO. Within the Founder LLC, eligible members generally have one vote each, and a majority determines how F votes. If no majority agrees on an ordinary matter, F generally follows the proportions of the A votes cast, subject to an A-share quorum. Certain matters have higher internal thresholds; failure to meet those thresholds produces a vote against the proposal instead. S-1, p. 249 and Class F voting mechanics
F can therefore determine the outcome of general stockholder votes, including the election of the three non-T directors, without electing the four T seats. Conversely, the LTBT’s board-election power does not let it bypass stockholder approval for a major transaction that requires both board and stockholder authorization.
Alongside A, T, F and E is Class N, held mainly by strategic partners. The five classes separate economic interests from different kinds of governance power:
| Class | Economic rights | Main governance role |
|---|---|---|
| A | Yes | One vote per share; votes with F on general stockholder matters and non-T director elections, with separate A approval for certain matters |
| N | Yes | Generally nonvoting, except as required by law; mainly held by strategic partners and generally converts to A on transfer to an unaffiliated third party |
| T | No | Held by the LTBT; generally elects and removes a board majority, with an additional process for the specified seat |
| F | No | Held by the Founder LLC; fixed at 50.1% of general stockholder voting power |
| E | No | Limited employee governance votes on the specified T seat and certain changes to the trust structure |
Source: S-1 cover, pp. 248–251 and Description of Capital Stock. These are the main rights, subject to the charter’s and the law’s specific conditions.
The E shares used in the specified-seat process do not follow a one-employee, one-vote rule. Allocation depends on service and on A shares pledged through the company’s donation-matching program or a future similar program. Co-founders do not receive E stock. The timing of E issuance will be set after the IPO closes. Employees’ governance role also reaches a second important question: how can the LTBT’s rules be changed?
The trust can be changed, but 50.1% is not enough on its own
A useful test of a safeguard is whether the people it constrains can remove it.
Anthropic’s documents provide ways to amend the LTBT and the rights of Class T. The same approval thresholds can also authorize redemption of T for no payment. The structure is not immutable. But a general vote combining A and F is not enough: the documents require distinct groups to meet separate approval thresholds. S-1, p. 246; trust agreement form, Section 4.3
If the trustees oppose a change, whose support do the founders need? The main consent routes are below. “Votes cast” and “outstanding shares” are different denominators: the latter includes shares whose holders do not turn up to vote.
| Situation | Required support | Quorum or calculation |
|---|---|---|
| Trustees support the change | 80% of authorized directors and 80% of trustees then in office | Each number is rounded to the nearest whole person; an exact half rounds up |
| Trustees do not support it; F remains outstanding; before the third anniversary of the IPO’s completion | All eligible Continuing Founders acting through F, plus a majority of E votes cast and a majority of A votes cast | E quorum: 40% of outstanding E; A quorum: a majority of outstanding A |
| Trustees do not support it; F remains outstanding; available at any time | Two-thirds of Continuing Founders, rounded up, acting through F; 75% of E votes cast; a majority of A votes cast | E and A each require a quorum of a majority of their outstanding shares |
| Trustees do not support it and F is no longer outstanding | 85% of outstanding A shares | Not merely 85% of votes cast or shares present |
Source: S-1, p. 246. These are the main consent routes under the governance arrangements. Applicable statutory procedures still matter, and the trust agreement also provides a narrow route for court modification or termination in specified circumstances.
Two conclusions follow. The trustees cannot always block a change: there are routes that do not require their support. Yet while F remains outstanding, those routes require separate founder, E and A approvals. The founders cannot simply use F’s ordinary voting majority to abolish the LTBT.
That gives A holders a distinct role. Calling public shareholders powerless would miss it. But the A electorate also includes founders and other insiders. A separate class vote is not the same as a veto reserved exclusively for outside public investors.
Which special share ends first changes who elects the board
The duration of the special rights matters as much as their initial allocation.
One important trigger for ending F concerns the number of founders who remain: having fewer than three qualifying Continuing Founders for 90 consecutive calendar days. That starts a 450-day transition, at the end of which F and E are redeemed for no payment. Adding successors during the transition does not extend the deadline. Other termination routes include dissolution of the Founder LLC and voluntary redemption under the specified approval threshold. S-1, pp. 248 and 252–254; Description of Capital Stock
T and F can end separately. If T ends while F remains, A and F would elect all directors. F’s fixed majority would then reach the board elections previously reserved for T.
If F ends while T survives, the founder group loses F’s fixed 50.1% general voting power. The LTBT retains its majority appointment power, and nominating or removing the Specified Class T Director without cause no longer requires NGC or E approval. A would elect the remaining directors and decide general stockholder matters. Only when both T and F are gone would A determine all director elections and general stockholder matters. S-1, p. 254
When F ends and T survives, powers previously divided between the founders and the trust are instead divided between the trust and A holders. Losing the founders’ fixed voting majority does not simultaneously give public investors the right to elect a board majority.
The trustees need accountability too
If the LTBT can replace directors, who selects the trustees? Under the ordinary process described in the IPO documents, a majority of serving trustees appoints new trustees; public shareholders do not elect them directly. The S-1 also says that, in practice to date, trustees have worked closely with company executives to source, interview and select candidates. Appointments require advance notice to the NGC. Giving notice does not mean that the appointment requires NGC approval. If every trustee seat becomes vacant, a separate fallback allows the board to appoint trustees under a special approval threshold. S-1, p. 246; trust agreement form, Section 2.4
Trustees can also be removed. The documents provide an internal route requiring a specified trustee majority, and another requiring unanimous approval from the other serving trustees plus NGC approval. People entitled to enforce the trust agreement may also ask a court to order removal under specified conditions involving disqualifying conduct. These are checks on trustees, but they do not mean any public shareholder can vote them out or bring such a claim. S-1, p. 246; trust agreement form, Sections 2.7 and 5.1
Beyond appointments and removals, shareholders need an account of how the board is fulfilling the mission. Delaware law requires a PBC to give stockholders a benefit assessment at least every two years. Anthropic intends to publish the statement on its website. Its charter and bylaws, however, would not require an objective third-party measurement standard. The board would establish and oversee its own standards, which the company expects to be largely qualitative and to evolve. The law still requires objective factual information against those standards; a mission statement alone is not the reporting obligation. Delaware law, Section 366; S-1, p. 244
Reports provide information; enforcing the board’s PBC balancing duty in court is a separate matter. Being affected by AI does not automatically give someone the right to bring that action. For a listed company, Section 367 requires plaintiffs, individually or collectively, to own at least 2% of outstanding shares or shares worth at least $2 million, whichever threshold is lower, alongside other applicable requirements. Those are rules for enforcing this particular duty, not a statement that other legal remedies disappear. Sections 365 and 367
Reduced control makes replacing decision-makers harder
For public investors, A shares provide economic rights, a general vote and a separate class vote on some routes for changing the LTBT. Those rights matter. But while the F and T arrangements remain in place, buying more A shares cannot by itself deliver a majority of the general vote or the right to elect a board majority.
The LTBT gives a trust with no economic rights in its T stock a concrete role in selecting directors. F gives the founder group a continuing general voting majority as new stock is issued. The potential benefit is space for a long-term mission and continuity of strategy. The cost is that outside shareholders have fewer ways to replace decision-makers through ordinary elections when they think the company is making mistakes. That is an interpretation of the structure, not a forecast of safety performance or investment returns.
Prospective investors are being asked to accept a bargain about control as well as growth. The PBC and the LTBT give the mission institutional support, but they do not substitute for judgment about the people using that power. If the board can explain what it believes but cannot show which decisions imposed a cost for the mission, and how the results were assessed, shareholders will struggle to evaluate what they received in exchange for their reduced control.
Version and scope: This article uses the public S-1 filed on October 26, 2026 and its accompanying forms of IPO governance documents. No subsequent public S-1/A appeared in the SEC records checked on October 28, Taipei time. Post-IPO arrangements described here reflect that version and may change in later amendments.
Frequently asked questions
Must Anthropic put public benefit ahead of profit because it is a PBC?
No. A PBC board must balance stockholders’ financial interests, the interests of people materially affected by the business and the charter’s public benefit purpose. The law does not predetermine that public benefit wins every conflict.
Does the LTBT already control four of seven occupied board seats?
No. The S-1 describes four Class T seats out of seven authorized seats after the IPO, but the initial T allocation includes a vacancy. At the time of filing, six directors were serving.
Can the founders use Class F’s 50.1% vote to abolish the LTBT?
Not on that percentage alone. Separate thresholds govern trust amendments and T redemption. The routes that proceed without trustee support while F remains outstanding require specified approvals from the founders, E holders and A holders separately.