After the Midterms, What Can Trump Still Change?
Democrats have won control of Congress, but Trump retains his veto and executive tools. How the new balance could affect trade, the global economy and Taiwan.
Democrats have won back Congress. Donald Trump remains in the White House. That combination is the starting point for understanding the 2026 US midterms: voters have changed who can obstruct policy and demand explanations, giving the president new negotiating partners for his remaining two years.
By the evening of November 5 in Taipei, AP and Reuters reporting had established Democratic control of both chambers, with Senate gains extending into Republican strongholds including Texas and Kansas. Some races remained unresolved. These are media race calls, rather than a statement that every state has completed certification. ABC’s AP-based results, Reuters’ post-election report
The change in control is clear. Its consequences will arrive at different speeds. Markets can reprice expectations immediately; Congress must negotiate budgets and legislation; companies then decide whether to change investment and purchasing. Taiwan often feels the effects further along that chain.
Voters want better living conditions and stronger checks on the presidency
The AP Voter Poll found that roughly two-thirds of voters believed Trump’s policies had made the economy worse, while about seven in ten thought Congress was not doing enough to check presidential power. Living costs and government corruption mattered, without an overwhelming endorsement of the Democratic Party itself. AP’s analysis
Those findings point to two demands operating together. Households want relief, and voters want power held accountable. An explanation focused entirely on prices misses the demand for oversight. An interpretation centered entirely on investigating Trump understates the economic responsibility Democrats are about to acquire.
My reading is that the election gives Democrats a larger opportunity to improve government, accompanied by a greater obligation to deliver. For dissatisfied voters, changing their support is one available tool. The coalition that produced this result could change again if the new majority fails to address its concerns.
It is too early to describe a permanent ideological realignment. Presidential and midterm elections involve different electorates, turnout and candidates. Changes in a group’s aggregate support require separating changes in who voted from changes in individual choices.
The AP Voter Poll combines sampling and interviewing methods to describe relationships between attitudes and voting. The early result supports a reading of accountability for governing performance and a demand for stronger checks. Establishing a lasting party realignment requires more elections and evidence about who participated. SSRS methodology
Congress can raise the cost of governing; Trump can still veto
The new congressional terms begin in January in the United States. Until then, the outgoing Congress continues to handle its agenda. The incoming majority’s powers do not become available the morning after election night. The Twentieth Amendment
Control of both chambers matters because several forms of leverage change together. The House and Senate can set agendas, investigate and bargain over funding. The Senate can also review nominations requiring its consent. Officials already confirmed do not automatically lose their positions when the majority changes. The Senate’s nominations role
| Tool | What the new majority can do | What still stands in the way |
|---|---|---|
| Hearings and investigations | Demand explanations from agencies and relevant companies | Findings do not rewrite the law by themselves |
| Funding negotiations | Seek changes in spending, conditions and priorities | An agreement must still pass and take effect |
| Confirmation proceedings | Examine new judicial and executive nominees | This does not transfer control of executive agencies |
| Legislation | Pursue statutory changes | Presidential vetoes, Senate procedure and differences between chambers remain |
Ordinarily, legislation needs agreement between both chambers and the president’s signature. Overriding a veto requires two-thirds support in each chamber. A simple majority is insufficient, and ordinary legislation can face an additional Senate barrier when ending debate. Senate voting and procedure
Trump still chooses whether to sign or veto legislation and can adjust measures under existing trade-law delegations. In diplomacy, he must still decide which terms to accept and how much pressure to apply. Each tool has legal and political limits; a change in Congress alters the cost of using it without removing every tool. A company assessing a policy needs to know whether the administration requires a new statute or already has room to act.
The advantage of divided government is that policy faces more demands to explain its costs. Its risk is paralysis over funding and implementation, including delays to measures both parties consider necessary. Neither deficit reduction nor a stable investment environment follows automatically. Much depends on where the two sides compromise and where they choose confrontation.
The global economy needs actual changes in tariffs and household costs
One tempting overinterpretation is that the election has opened a quick route to removing tariffs. Trade and legal specialists interviewed by Reuters said Democrats would gain oversight and funding leverage, but efforts to repeal tariffs or withdraw presidential authority would still face Trump’s veto. Reuters on the tariff veto barrier
The legal foundation of tariff policy has already changed this year. An October Congressional Research Service overview records how the administration turned to other trade authorities after the Supreme Court rejected its use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act for tariffs in February. These include Section 232, addressing national security, and Section 301 trade investigations.
The statutes delegate room for executive action while setting conditions and procedures. Congress can pursue amendments to those delegations, which returns the issue to negotiation between the chambers and the president. Businesses therefore still need to examine the product, exemption and origin rules that apply to their shipments. CRS overview, reproduced by EveryCRSReport
If negotiations eventually reduce import costs and regulatory reversals, businesses and households could benefit. More hearings alone do not remove the costs companies already face.
US household purchasing power provides a separate international channel. If essential expenses keep squeezing disposable income, overseas suppliers could face weaker final demand. Lower energy or import costs could ease that pressure. These are conditions to test against subsequent data; ballots do not immediately raise household incomes.
Interest rates follow another decision process. The Federal Reserve’s institutional framework is designed around objectives including price stability and employment. A new congressional majority does not decide the next interest-rate meeting. The Fed on its independence
The dollar, long-term Treasury yields and equities may respond quickly to election news, then continue adjusting to growth, inflation and fiscal expectations. Extending the first few trading sessions into a two-year forecast skips those underlying variables.
De-escalation has political appeal; Trump can still choose pressure
In public remarks on November 4 in the United States, Trump linked higher gasoline prices to the war against Iran while saying he would make the same choice again. His account of the policy’s costs shows how foreign-policy decisions enter the political debate over living expenses. WSJ transcript of the remarks, carried by Yahoo
This creates another incentive to de-escalate, with two competing paths. Trump could seek an agreement to reduce energy and political costs. He could also decide that greater pressure is necessary to obtain terms he can defend at home. His counterpart’s judgment about American patience will influence the bargain as well.
Between stronger congressional checks and a peace agreement lie executive choices, the other side’s response and conditions on the ground. For European and Asian economies, shipping routes, supplies, insurance and actual agreements are more useful indicators than assuming the election has removed energy risk.
China technology policy also resists a simple party split. Senators from both parties introduced the MATCH Act this year to coordinate semiconductor-equipment export controls with allies. The proposal demonstrates a bipartisan direction, while remaining distinct from rules that have actually taken effect. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the MATCH Act
A change in congressional control could alter coordination and oversight while leaving a substantial foundation for technology-security competition intact. Allies might gain more opportunities for consultation while also facing clearer demands to participate.
Taiwan should watch where the wake reaches its economy
A large ship can pass a smaller vessel without touching it, yet leave a wake strong enough to shake it. American policy often reaches Taiwan in a similar way. A measure need not target Taiwan directly to transmit changes through demand, capital and costs.
The useful part of the analogy is identifying the source of the wake and the exposure it meets. The pre-election trade structure provides a baseline. Taiwan’s International Trade Administration reported that information, communication and audiovisual products accounted for 44.9% of September exports, and electronic components for 35.7%. Adding those published shares gives 80.6%, illustrating concentrated exposure to demand for those categories. The categories cover many uses and do not identify an AI-only share. Taiwan’s September trade summary
| Transmission channel | Condition for an effect | Evidence to watch first |
|---|---|---|
| US demand and purchasing | Household spending, business investment or customer projects actually change | Customer guidance, delivery schedules, company calls and subsequent statistics |
| Tariffs and export controls | Rules, licensing or enforcement change | Final text, covered products, exemptions and compliance requirements |
| Finance and currencies | Rates, risk appetite and company currency exposure change | Capital flows, hedging and the currencies of revenues and costs |
| Energy and transport | Conflict, supplies or shipping routes change | Import costs, insurance and domestic price transmission |
The same change can affect companies differently. Currency moves influence export revenue, imported equipment and hedges. A data-center delay can alter one project while purchasing for other uses continues. Taiwan’s economy needs to be examined by industry and contract; its stock market is not one company.
Security ties also depend on implementation. In September, Democratic Senator Elissa Slotkin and Republican Senator Thom Tillis jointly called for progress on Taiwan arms sales and opposed making them a bargaining chip with Beijing. That establishes a basis for bipartisan support. Notifications, funding and delivery are still needed to turn support into capabilities. The senators’ joint position
Changes written into statutes, permits and contracts can last longer than the headlines. Trump can seek a funding bargain, use existing trade tools, and choose negotiation or pressure abroad. The new Congress can demand explanations of the costs and raise barriers to some actions.
For a Taiwanese business reading the next policy announcement, the first question is whether it requires legislation or can already be implemented by the administration. Then check whether the product, factory location or contract falls within its scope. Changes in customer delivery dates, tariffs or import costs provide a basis for estimating the effect. That is how a company can identify which part of the American ship’s wake is approaching it.
Frequently asked questions
Does Democratic control of Congress mean Trump’s policies will all be reversed?
Congress can intensify oversight, negotiate funding and pursue legislation, while the Senate can review certain nominations. Trump retains his veto and statutory executive tools. Actual changes depend on specific laws, agreements and implementation.
Do the results prove a permanent shift toward Democrats?
They do not establish that. Voter surveys describe attitudes toward the administration and checks on presidential power. Different elections have different electorates, turnout and candidates, so changes in group-level support are not records of individual voters switching sides.
Will tariffs and interest rates fall after the midterms?
There is no automatic mechanism. Tariffs depend on the relevant authority, rules and negotiations. The Federal Reserve responds to inflation, employment and financial conditions. The election alone cannot determine either direction.
What should Taiwan watch first?
Watch US customer purchasing and delivery plans, the text of tariff and export-control changes, financial and currency conditions, and energy and transport costs. These are transmission indicators; an initial stock-market move does not establish an industrial impact.
Scope: Election and policy information is fixed at the evening of November 5, 2026, Taipei time. Results use media calls without assigning final totals to unresolved races. The SSRS survey combines probability-based and opt-in samples with mail, telephone, text, online and some in-person interviews, rather than consisting solely of polling-place exit interviews. Taiwan’s trade figures cover September 2026. Subsequent policy and industrial effects are conditional analysis, rather than outcomes already established.