Ryanair, Spirit and Why Budget Airlines Need More Than Low Fares
Ryanair built a huge low-fare business while Spirit stopped flying. Basic fares and co-branded cards exist in both the US and Europe, so the tools alone do not explain the gap. A budget airline lasts only if its costs, network and airports still give it an edge when rivals cut fares too.
The Ryanair Group carried 208.4 million passengers in its financial year ending March 2026. A few weeks later, on May 2, Spirit Airlines stopped operating. The contrast is striking: a huge European business built around low fares, and an American ultra-low-cost carrier that could no longer keep flying. Ryanair annual report, US Government Accountability Office report
It is tempting to explain this through passenger preferences. Perhaps Europeans tolerate fewer frills, while Americans expect more. But willingness to pay a baggage fee does not settle the airline’s harder problem: whether the total money collected covers aircraft, employees, fuel and airports.
Spirit’s collapse makes the question urgent, but the economics of budget flying reach beyond one company’s fate. What lets an airline keep offering cheap fares when rivals cut theirs too? Successful European budget airlines have built networks around their cost structures. In the US, independent ultra-low-cost airlines must compete with large carriers that can sell cheap seats while drawing on broader networks and other sources of revenue. Answering the question means looking at where a budget airline’s savings come from, at the tools its competitors use, and at whether those tools are uniquely American.
America has low-cost airlines. Their competitive problem has changed.
“Budget airline” can obscure an important distinction. A low-cost carrier, or LCC, typically reduces complexity through measures such as point-to-point service and fewer aircraft types. An ultra-low-cost carrier, or ULCC, puts greater emphasis on a low starting fare and separately charged services. These are descriptions of business models, not permanent classifications that every airline fits perfectly. GAO’s airline categories
The US has a substantial history of low-fare growth. Under GAO’s classification, ultra-low-cost carriers increased their share of domestic passengers from 4% in 2007 to 13% in 2022. Southwest, which GAO classifies as low-cost, remains a substantial operating business, though it has since added bag fees and a basic economy fare, moving away from its earlier approach. Spirit’s failure does not erase that history. GAO market-share analysis, Southwest third-quarter results
Past growth, however, does not guarantee present profitability. Airlines, analysts and officials interviewed by GAO described rising costs and changing competition after the pandemic. For a carrier whose main attraction is price, raising fares risks losing customers; holding fares down means absorbing more of the cost increase.
That is the question worth pursuing. Why have some European low-cost airlines developed into large competitive forces, while independent US carriers at the cheapest end of the market face such pressure?
Ryanair’s savings reach much further than the meal service
Ryanair’s annual report describes a practical cost system: short-haul, point-to-point flying, a fleet predominantly made up of Boeing 737s, and close attention to airport and handling charges. Avoiding connections reduces baggage-transfer and connecting-passenger work. A more uniform fleet simplifies training, maintenance and spare-parts management. Where feasible, the airline uses cheaper gate positions and outdoor boarding stairs. Ryanair annual report, pages 193–194
The interaction matters. Removing a service saves the cost of that service. It does not fix an expensive schedule or an inefficient operation. Conversely, a modest operational saving can become significant if it can be repeated across a large number of flights.
The fare is not the whole revenue picture either. Ryanair earned roughly €24 in ancillary revenue per passenger during April–June 2026, through optional products and services. A passenger buying only the basic journey and one purchasing extras can therefore contribute different amounts to the airline’s revenue. Ryanair quarterly results
Sustaining a low fare requires both sides of the business to work:
| Business choice | What it can accomplish | What still has to work |
|---|---|---|
| Simplify aircraft and ground operations | Reduce complexity and repeat a process at scale | Routes, equipment and staffing must fit the system |
| Spread fixed costs across more seats | Reduce the fixed-cost burden per seat | Additional seats still need sufficient demand |
| Charge separately for optional services | Preserve a low entry price while earning extra revenue | Providing those services still has a cost |
| Select suitable airports and flight times | Combine manageable charges with useful demand | A cheap airport is not necessarily a profitable destination |
An airline can change a fare quickly. Changing the cost of delivering the journey may require a different fleet, contracts or network. If the revenue and cost sides do not move together, selling more tickets can simply expand the loss.
Europe created room to expand, but no single airport formula
Start with scale. EUROCONTROL puts low-cost operators at approximately 35% of all instrument-flight-rules flights in its Network Manager area in 2025, a similar share to its mainline category. This measures flights, not passengers or short-haul seats, but it shows that low-cost airlines have become a major part of Europe’s flying. EUROCONTROL’s 2025 review, page 15
Europe’s single aviation market provided an important foundation for cross-border growth. The European Commission says the market created in the 1990s removed commercial restrictions within the EU on routes, flight frequencies and fares. Eligible EU airlines could operate on routes throughout the EU rather than remain tied to their home country’s market. European Commission: the internal aviation market
For an airline with a repeatable operating model, that means a wider range of routes on which to deploy it. It can look for combinations of demand and airport conditions that suit its business. The United States already has a large domestic market, however. European liberalization helps explain how European airlines expanded; it cannot, by itself, explain why American airlines struggle.
Nor does European success require avoiding every major airport. Ryanair has expanded its presence at primary airports. easyJet explicitly prioritizes primary and slot-constrained airports, serving business travelers as well as leisure passengers and people visiting friends and relatives. Ryanair annual report, page 194, easyJet’s business model
Those choices make economic sense in different ways. Lower airport charges help on the cost side. Access to customers and useful departure times may help on the revenue side. easyJet’s strategy illustrates why a low-cost business need not choose the cheapest possible input at every step. The whole combination has to work.
Large airlines compete for the cheapest customer too
Europe’s story so far is about how budget airlines grew. In the US, the question is what kind of rival an independent discounter faces. The competitive equation changes when a large airline can also put a cheap ticket on the shopping screen.
GAO reports that, by 2018, US network airlines had introduced basic economy: lower-priced tickets with fewer included services or more restrictions. Lower-cost airlines and an equity analyst interviewed for the report said these products narrowed the fare gap. The choice can become two similarly priced tickets with different conditions, rather than a clear trade-off between an expensive large airline and a cheap discounter. GAO on basic economy
A network airline does not have to rebuild its entire operation as a ULCC to compete for this customer. It can serve different budgets within the same network and price its products accordingly. The independent discounter, meanwhile, needs its overall operation to sustain its cost advantage. Its rival is matching one product, not necessarily adopting the same company-wide business model.
Co-branded credit cards add another dimension. Airlines sell loyalty points to banks, which use them to reward cardholders. Delta reported $8.2 billion in remuneration from American Express during 2025. That remuneration is not the card business’s net profit; subtracting it from the company’s overall profit would not isolate the profit or loss from flying. It does show the scale of a commercial relationship that extends beyond ticket purchases. Delta’s 2025 results
Officials and industry participants interviewed by GAO said card-related income can provide stability and pricing flexibility. Smaller carriers may offer cards too, but their networks and customer bases can make their rewards less attractive and limit the terms available from banking partners. GAO on airline credit cards
This is a difference in competitive resources, not proof of a measurable card subsidy behind every cheap seat. Low fares can benefit passengers even when the airline offering them is not an independent low-cost carrier.
These tools are not unique to US network airlines. British Airways offers Economy Basic fares that exclude checked baggage, and IAG’s 2025 annual report records a multi-year extension of IAG Loyalty’s co-branded-card partnership with American Express. The distinction is therefore not that only US incumbents unbundle fares or operate card partnerships. Nor does this article have comparable data for both regions showing that competition is necessarily stronger in the United States. British Airways baggage essentials, IAG 2025 annual report, printed page 56
If such tools exist in both markets, an individual budget airline’s position depends on what it has built: its cost base, network and customer position. Garth Lund, who spent nearly eight years in leadership at the Wizz Air group, told CNN that European discounters’ sustained focus on their original model had helped them maintain their cost structures more successfully than US airlines. That is an industry participant’s judgment, not a like-for-like cost measurement across the two regions. Returning to the practices in Ryanair’s annual report, the argument here is that when a rival also sells cheap tickets, what holds up is the cost base, not the fare itself. CNN, October 20, 2026
A larger fleet is no substitute for a workable airport schedule
If scale helps, why not add aircraft and grow? Because an additional aircraft is not automatically an additional profitable schedule.
Twenty-three stakeholders interviewed by GAO identified airport access as an issue, particularly at hubs. Incumbents’ preferential gate rights can make it difficult to obtain suitable locations, times or enough gates. Some airport agreements also give dominant users influence over whether expansions that would increase airline charges can proceed. GAO on airport access
This does not mean every US airport is closed to newcomers or that European airports face no capacity constraints. These examples show an obstacle to US independents’ expansion; they do not establish that American airports are harder to enter than European ones. It means airline competition takes place at particular locations and times. Demand in a city is not enough if a carrier cannot turn it into flights on commercially workable terms.
That puts a limit on the promise of scale. Fixed costs can be spread more widely only if aircraft can be deployed in schedules that attract passengers and operate at an acceptable cost. Expansion on unfavorable terms may reintroduce the costs the airline was trying to remove.
Copying a baggage-fee menu therefore does not reproduce the network that Ryanair or easyJet has built. The visible product is easier to copy than the combination of airport access, flight times and customer demand behind it.
Ryanair’s profit can fall, and Frontier is still flying
Even Ryanair is not insulated from cost pressure. Ryanair carried more passengers during April–June 2026 but reported a 34% year-on-year decline in profit after tax, alongside lower fares and a jump in unhedged fuel prices. A large operation with strong cost discipline can still suffer a sharp squeeze. Ryanair quarterly results
Nor are American carriers uniformly on a downward path. Frontier’s report for July–September 2026, released on October 28, showed a net loss of $104 million under generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP, and adjusted non-GAAP net income of $40 million after the company’s specified adjustments. The improvement in adjusted results matters, but it does not erase the reported loss or establish that recovery is complete. Frontier third-quarter results
The real test comes when a rival matches the fare
Back to the opening contrast. Europe also has large airlines with basic fares and co-branded cards. Once those tools are understood, the more useful comparison is how individual airlines put the rest of their businesses together. The European success cases show what happens when a low-cost operation, a cross-border network and a revenue model fit together. Independent US ultra-low-cost carriers must defend their economics in a market where larger airlines also compete for price-sensitive travelers. The airport-access barriers GAO documented and large airlines’ broader revenue sources affect how much room they have to do that.
The conclusion is that a budget airline’s durable advantage has to survive a rival matching its fare. Unbundling alone cannot supply that advantage, and expansion does not create it automatically. A carrier needs aircraft, airport access and demand to fit into a profitable network. Without that, cheap seats may remain available while the independent businesses built specifically to challenge larger airlines on cost disappear. For travelers, these are separate questions: whether cheap seats exist today, and whether an airline remains that can keep pressing rivals on price because its costs are lower. If those independents fade, low fares would depend more on how large airlines choose to price their own seats.
Scope and timing: Sources were checked through October 29, 2026, Taipei time. This analysis identifies supported competitive mechanisms, not a quantified ranking of the causes of the US–Europe gap. Company examples do not represent every airline in either region. European flight shares and US passenger shares cover different measures and years, so they cannot be directly compared.
Frequently asked questions
Has the low-cost airline model ever succeeded in the US?
Yes. Southwest is an important counterexample, and low-cost airlines should not all be treated as identical to carriers that rely more heavily on unbundled, ultra-low fares. The issue is the competitive pressure on independent ultra-low-cost airlines, not whether American low-fare flying has ever worked.
Do all European budget airlines depend on out-of-town airports?
No. Ryanair emphasizes airport costs but also serves primary airports. easyJet makes primary and slot-constrained airports central to its strategy. A suitable airport depends on demand, available times, charges and achievable fares together.
Does credit card revenue prove that airlines subsidize every cheap ticket?
No. Co-branded cards can diversify revenue and support pricing flexibility, but remuneration is not net profit. It does not reveal a subsidy for an individual ticket or replace route-level financial information.